Alan Montefiore

Tributes

Opening Remarks at Alan Montefiore’s Memorial at
Balliol College  

Alan Montefiore read Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at Balliol in 1948, graduating with a 1st in 1950; he was a Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy from 1961 to 1994, and an Emeritus Fellow from 1994 until his death in October 2024. We will hear much this afternoon about Alan’s marvellous contributions in so many domains but I would like to speak briefly about the Alan we knew and greatly loved here: the Philosophy Fellow and PPE tutor.

Alan was my PPE tutor at Balliol (I first met him in 1981), before becoming my colleague and friend. He had so many wonderful qualities: he was warm, kind, generous, brilliant, compassionate, public-spirited, cosmopolitan, optimistic. He never raised his voice, and even if you disagreed with him (as one did sometimes) it was always courteous. More often than not, I should say, he was right. But he never rubbed your face in it.

One of his supreme talents was bringing people together. This was no abstract principle: he lived it. He lived it in his legendary Kant classes in Staircase X, which welcomed people from across Oxford. He lived it in the way he thought about PPE as a genuinely interdisciplinary Balliol project, in which the three subjects overlapped with and enriched each other. He lived it in the way he did Philosophy, embracing such topics as the political responsibility of intellectuals, exchanging with scientists about goal-directed behaviour, and asking whether economic agents could act with integrity (not sure there was an affirmative answer there ! but Alan kept looking; this was his Kantian optimism).

And he lived it by devoting his life to bringing together the two great modern western philosophical traditions, the analytic and the continental. This was a great bonus for us at Balliol because Alan would invite exciting rock stars like Jacques Derrida to come and speak. We did not understand what Derrida said but I think that was the point. Another highlight was Alan’s regular lunches with Isaiah Berlin, they would sit in the same corner in the SCR Dining Room and gossip away.

Alan had the most compendious mind: his knowledge was phenomenal, as was his memory. When I was in my final year as an undergraduate in 1984 I remember one of my tutorial partners thought he would pull a fast one on Alan and read out an essay on Hume which he had already produced for him for a tutorial two years earlier. Alan listened to the essay, got up, went to his desk, pulled out a diary from two years before, and with that lovely amused glint in his eye told my tutorial partner: “you read this essay out to me on…” (and gave him the exact date and time).

Bringing people together is also about universalism, another Alan forte. When we discussed the applications for admissions among the PPE Fellows Alan always championed one or two candidates, in whom he saw something promising which the rest of us could not quite see, and who he believed would contribute something valuable to the social/intellectual mix. And he would more often than not prevail upon his colleagues to admit these candidates, generally by convincing us, but also sometimes just through his sheer will-power: he was indefatigable – and the rest of us wanted to get home before midnight. I remember one session when we started discussing a candidate at 10 and were still going at 1045 pm, and Alan was still holding out. Wilfred Beckerman announced: “I give up”. By hook or by crook, Alan always got his way.

Even when you were escaping from Alan, good things could happen. I recall tiptoeing out of one of his evening seminars about identity at his St Margaret’s road flat in the early 1990s (the speaker was a bit opaque) and as I slipped away I heard the door close quietly behind me: another person was leaving. Her name was Karma Nabulsi, we ran away giggling and it was one of my very first meetings with my future partner, and we have been together for thirty five years. As he did so often and for so many people, Alan brought us together.

Sudhir Hazareesingh,
May 2025.

(Reproduced with the kind permission of the author)

Alan Montefiore Tribute

Guy Evans, 30 June 

The German poet Herder once said of Immanuel Kant that “he encouraged and gently compelled people to think for themselves.” Based on my experience as an undergraduate studying PPE (Philosophy, Politics and Economics) at Balliol in the late 1980s, the same can be said of Alan Montefiore.

Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that a number of steers and interventions from Alan — part of me still instinctively inclines to write ‘Professor Montefiore’ out of deference to that time — changed the course of my life.

For my second year, I had opted to study politics and economics, focusing on papers appropriate for taking a law conversion course after finals. My heart wasn’t in this at all, but practicalities and parental pressure made it seem inevitable. I had no interest in analytical philosophy or the Oxford tradition, yet I was deeply drawn to continental philosophy and political theory. I spent the summer break at the end of my first year writing a mini-thesis on Sartre and Existential Marxism, a passion of mine, for a college essay competition.

Midway through Michaelmas of my second year, Alan called me into his room on staircase X and told me I had won a prize. He added, gently but with an undercurrent of significance: “It’s a shame you’ve given up philosophy. Because to really understand Sartre, you need to study Hegel. And you can’t truly get to grips with Hegel without knowing Kant. I teach a whole paper on him…”

I changed to philosophy and politics there and then.

The eulogies at Alan’s memorial service at Balliol made clear that I was far from the only undergraduate who had been steered in such a way into the Kant classes. At the time, this felt like such a natural choice to make, and such a relief, that it took me years to realise what a gift Alan had given me. What strikes me most, in retrospect, was the manner in which he guided me, without the slightest pressure or persuasion. As great teachers do, Alan recognised what my intellectual passions were before I had fully done so myself, and simply presented me with the information I needed to make my own choice.

I ended up specialising in continental and Marxist political and social theory. I have never for a moment regretted it.

Though I wasn’t really aware of this at the time, Alan was one of the very few – possibly the only – Oxford tutor who would have actively encouraged such forays into continental philosophy. As undergraduates, all of us PPE-ists knew of his immersion in that exotic and somewhat murky world of theory. Stories were traded in Balliol Bar of Alan answering the phone during a tutorial and saying: Bonjour Jacques! (we all knew this meant Jacques Derrida). Or supposedly visiting Louis Althusser when he was confined during a breakdown, reduced to stroking stones while whispering: Marx! Marx!

But not until the memorial service did I fully realise what a unique culture Alan had created at Balliol, and how lucky I was to have found a supportive guide into those schools of thought.  After Kant and Hegel, I was off into Althusser and the Frankfurt School, from Adorno to Habermas. Rational Choice Marxism passed me by entirely. I was fortunate that there were just enough questions on the Marxism finals paper that I could bend and twist to introduce the thinkers I’d been studying.

The service brought many such memories flooding back. Especially welcome, and unexpected, were vivid flashbacks to just how much I loved studying and engaging with these subjects. Every week, each book and tutorial, was an intellectual adventure that enhanced and extended my framework for understanding the world. I will always be grateful to Alan for creating the container that allowed this, as he did for many other generations of students.

I particularly recall one evening, working late in a cubicle in Balliol library, wrestling with Kant and Hegel’s philosophies of freedom. I spent hours struggling to understand, becoming more and more confused. Finally I gave up trying, and at that moment, out of nowhere, I suddenly saw the intellectual edifice as a whole — how the different approaches were entwined and interconnected. The architecture was so beautiful that I burst into tears. This remains one of my most treasured memories of my student days, if not my whole life. I was glad that I was able, at the memorial drinks, to tell this story to Bill Weinstein who had led me through Hegel.

For me, Alan’s support extended beyond the purely intellectual. At the start of my last year at Balliol, I was struggling. Though I had no idea at the time, I was skirting around a nervous breakdown and edging into anorexia. Alan, who was my moral tutor, called me into his room, sat me down and said he could see I was in some trouble. He suggested I take a couple of weeks’ compassionate leave to go home and that he would sort all the official clearances. What strikes me most now is how quietly supportive and unjudgmental Alan was. This break gave me some space to pull myself together, and the kindness shown by a senior figure acted as an anchor during that turbulent time.

There was one more direct intervention by Alan that was genuinely life changing. During that last year, Verso published Jean Baudrillard’s America, his post-modern journey around the USA, travelling in de Tocqueville’s footsteps. Baudrillard was very little known at that time and certainly not taught, but I was intrigued and immersed myself in his work. So when I submitted an application for that year’s Coolidge Pathfinder scholarship to the USA, my proposed project was to follow in Baudrillard’s wake across the country, exploring sites of simulation and hyperreality.

Alan told me later that the Pathfinder projects students pitched were uniformly worthy: working for a politician, experience in business or finance, volunteering for an NGO or campaigning group. Apparently, mine was so pretentious and off the wall it made the judging committee laugh. So they awarded me one. Given that the idea involved an especially obscure French theorist, I’m convinced that Alan must have had some extra input on that decision.

Highlights of the trip included a couple of very pleasant days theorising about Disneyland while enjoying the rides there, but that Coolidge scholarship also opened unexpected doors. I had a long phone conversation with Christopher Hitchens, an ex-Pathfinder whose writing and journalism I hugely admired. He suggested I visit his editor at The Nation in New York, which I did. A few years later, I found myself there on an internship as Christopher’s researcher. A witty and over-generous fax reference from him later secured me my first job in television documentary production in the UK, my career ever since.

It was very satisfying at the memorial drinks to meet and talk with Steven Lukes’ wife, Katha Pollitt, a leading Nation columnist at the same time as Christopher but whom I had never met before.

Alan’s influence has shaped my work in deeper ways, ones that only became clear to me during the Balliol memorial eulogies. Over the decades, I’ve made biographical documentary portraits of American presidents and Hollywood celebrities, Nobel prize winners and rock stars, comedians and classical composers. What I now see is how much Alan’s tutorial style affected my own ideal interviewing approach: humane and curious but knowing when to choose the moment for a curveball question that prompts a new train of thought and surprising answers. It was his gentle guidance — never pushy, always insightful and intuitive — that I find myself aiming to emulate while creating a safe space for interviewees, just as Alan did for his students.

More than that, during the memorial I was struck by the lingering legacy of those Kant classes about the ‘moral law within’ and the golden rule of ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.’ These had shaped me far more than I had previously appreciated. It suddenly seemed unsurprising that in recent years I have been drawn to making BBC documentaries about female and Black classical composers whose work has been neglected and forgotten – films which caught the waves of #MeToo and #BLM and helped change the repertoire and radio playlists here in the UK. A biographical film with conductor and composer Daniel Barenboim covered the East-Western Divan Orchestra he founded with his close friend, the Palestinian intellectual Edward Said, and Barenboim’s deep conviction that classical music can contain a humanistic and even utopian impulse.

My most recent BBC series, Paid In Full: The Battle for Black Music, showed how Black popular musical artists and record labels have been exploited by the music industry since the early 20th century. It laid out the ethical and practical case for reparations and institutional reforms, to redress past wrongs and prevent future ones.  It felt very appropriate that while on my way home from Oxford after Alan’s memorial I received news that Paid In Full had won its second international award in a fortnight. 

I regret now that I didn’t keep in touch with Alan after I left Balliol. I wish that I had told him about all of this in person while it was still possible to do so. But I am grateful to have the opportunity to do so here, in writing.

On a final, lighter note: Alan’s tutorials were invariably focused and serious, his attention fully engaged as we wrestled with complex philosophical problems.  Perhaps this is why I made it a mission during undergraduate Kant classes to try and make Alan laugh. One day I played him a postmodern pop song by Scritti Politti containing the line: “I got a reason girl/Was Immanuel Kant’s/(and I like it)”, but this led only to a raised eyebrow. During an all-nighter grinding out an essay on the Schematism, one of the most impenetrable parts of the Critique of Pure Reason, I worked in a quote from Robert Musil’s Young Törless that when studying Kant “it was as if some aged, bony hand were twisting and screwing his brain out of his head“. This provoked a wry smile.

Finally, I shared my theory about how different the result for Western philosophy might have been if Kant had not remained a virgin. Maybe he would have happily married. Given himself up to a life of decadent debauchery and abandoned philosophy entirely. Or perhaps a less uptight Kant could have done us all a great favour and written the Critique of Pure Reason in a hundred or so concise, clear and easily understood pages.

This prompted a very satisfying guffaw from Alan and remains my fondest memory of him: sitting in his chair in a knitted sweater, glasses perched on the bridge of his nose, laughing out loud.

(Reproduced with the kind permission of the author)

Alan Montefiore (1926-2024)

1948, Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy 1961-1994, Tutor for Admissions 1962-1967, Emeritus Fellow from 1994
Dr Andrew Graham (Fellow and Tutor in Economics 1969-2001, Master 2001-2011, Honorary Fellow)

I sometimes remark that being at Balliol is rather like having a stone in your shoe – tiny relative to your body mass but altering the whole way you walk. Alan Montefiore had much the same impact. Initially, I was too much in awe of him to think clearly about what was going on, but I gradually came to understand the shape of his conversations. At the start, he often appeared sympathetic to whatever position one had taken, but a few steps down the road, he would be inviting you to realise that you must have been mistaken as you were now so clearly contradicting yourself.

Over the years, the ‘Alan stone’ led me to see three things, obvious to philosophers, but often overlooked in general discussion. First, if a line of reasoning leads to a contradiction or clashes with reality, either the logic is mistaken, or the starting assumptions are adrift – the latter a particular affliction in economics.

Second, if you are going to have a discussion – rather than a shouting match – there must be something on which you agree. Alan illustrated this vividly in one of my very first encounters. He had been in Singapore on sabbatical in 1968 and had listened to the broadcasts by the Americans and by the Chinese (I later learned that part of his National Service had been spent in Singapore and that he could speak Hokkien). Their accounts were diametrically opposed, yet on one issue they were agreed – there was a war.

Third, most of our claims about the world are context dependent. Alan was impressive across the board, but to my mind where he excelled and where he made his greatest contribution was in teasing out how the context mattered – whether that context is internal (who am I and to whom do I owe commitments?) or external (in what ways has this idea been seen differently in varying cultures and languages?).

When Alan started teaching at Balliol, Oxford analytical philosophy, concentrating heavily on logic and the philosophy of language, was at its height. An ‘is’ was never to be confused with an ‘ought’. The positive and the normative were not only in different boxes but needed to be kept so. However, from early on, Alan, bilingual in French, had an interest in Continental philosophy where context was allowed full sway, especially the position of the speaker. Or, as Alan might have put it, given the fact (an ‘is’) that he was born Jewish, this entails an obligation (an ‘ought’) to that faith, or to that community.

Once the study of Kant was brought formally into PPE in the 1960s, Alan began a seminar devoted to Kantian philosophy. The seminar soon became legendary. In the collection of essays marking Alan’s 85th birthday, no fewer than six contributions were devoted to it, with Michael Sandel (1975) writing that it was ‘a centre piece of academic life at Balliol’.

Alan was a wonderful example of the engaged intellectual, willing not only to think but to act. When the Wiener Holocaust Memorial Library faced a funding crisis in 1980, it was Alan who stepped in and persuaded the former Prime Minister, James Callaghan, to become the first President of the Endowment Appeal. Alan was the Governor of the Froebel Educational Institute (which later became part of the University of Roehampton) and, alongside his Balliol work, he was actively engaged with Kathy Wilkes (St Hildas) and his Balliol colleagues, Tony Kenny (Fellow 1964–1978, Master 1978–1989) and Bill Newton-Smith (Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy 1970–2005), in organising underground seminars with dissidents in what was then Czechoslovakia. He was a founding member of the Jan Hus Educational Foundation which backed this work and in 2019 he was awarded the Czech Honorary Jan Masaryk Silver Medal.

After retirement, he and his second wife, French philosopher Catherine Audard, founded the Forum for European Philosophy, which ran weekly seminars at LSE for 25 years, broadening access to diverse philosophical traditions. Catherine was the Chair, and they worked closely with three former pupils, Simon Glendinning, Hilary Lawson (1972) and Paul Flather (1973). He continued to write, producing, amongst others, A Philosophical Retrospective (2011) and Philosophy and the Human Paradox (2019). In his 97th year, he was as sharp as ever, and was in Paris with Catherine, doing The Times cryptic cross word when his fatal heart-attack struck.

Alan was born in London in 1926, the son of Leonard Montefiore (the first President of the Wiener Library), and grandson of Claude Joseph Goldsmid Montefiore, a theologian and the founder of the London Society for the Study of Religion. He was educated at Clifton College, Bristol, earning high praise from them for his multiple talents, including ball games, especially squash. His housemaster wrote in his final report, ‘No other boy within my experience has won so much affection and respect from both masters and boys throughout the school’.

Many years later, I learnt to my cost how skilfully he played squash when I spent a Sunday morning scrabbling desperately to rescue the ball from corner after corner as Alan stood at the centre nonchalantly dispatching my returns. In squash, good players focus not on where the ball was hit, but where it will land. Later, I saw an analogy with arguments. Especially when discussing with someone as clever as Alan, it paid to think as much about his desired end point as about the current move.

After three years of National Service, much of it in Singapore, Alan came to Balliol to read PPE in 1948 – he had been admitted in 1945 but demobbed only in 1948.  He had first considered Classics, then English, before settling on Modern Studies, as PPE was known. In 1951, he took up a teaching post at Keele University. Keele had only been founded the year before (the moving force being ‘Sandy’ Lindsay, Master of Balliol 1924-1949), and the story is that Alan was in the quad when his personal tutor called down to him that Keele was seeking young lecturers, so why not apply? Around the same time, in March 1952, Alan married Hélène (née Pivant) in Paris. Since she was a gentile, neither of his parents came to the wedding, and his mother avoided speaking to Hélène or even seeing her first granddaughter for several years. Alan and Hélène had three children: Anne, a counsellor, Claire, a psychotherapist, and Paul, a photographer and interior designer.

In 1961, armed with impressive references from, amongst others, ‘Sammy’ Finer (Lecturer in Politics 1946–1949, JRF in Politics 1949–1950), who had also moved from Balliol to Keele, and Stuart Hampshire (1933), he was elected to a Fellowship at Balliol, where he remained until his retirement. In 1984, he married Catherine Audard, bringing her children, Sylvain, Laure-Hélène, and Florence, into his life, and he and Catherine worked intensively together for the remainder of his long life.

In addition to, and entirely in tune with, his interest in continental philosophy, Alan believed strongly in multi-disciplinary exchange. Bill Weinstein (Politics Fellow) and I (Economics Fellow) contributed to his 1975 volume on Neutrality and Impartiality: the University and Political Commitment – an issue right back in the news as I write. In 1997, he edited Integrity in the Public and Private Domains with economist David Vines (Emeritus Fellow), and in 2021, Goals, No Goals and Own Goals with physiologist Denis Noble (Emeritus Fellow).

Steven Lukes (1958) has memorably described Alan as the ‘Le Grand Anti-simplificateur’. This brilliantly evokes Alan’s multidimensional manner of thinking, as well as what I regard as his highly ‘leveraged’ way of arguing. By ‘leveraged’, I mean the way in which Alan could focus on what, to most of us, might seem a quite narrow issue where a decision was required, and show that, viewed with more thought, it had geopolitical implications. In the nicest possible way, this tended to happen most when he hoped one might change one’s mind or could be persuaded to do something – if only one had the breadth of intelligence to see the light. On one occasion, we were about to turn down an applicant for admission, when Alan brought into play that the applicant’s first language was German and that, philosophically, what he had been trying to argue would be much richer in German. We duly re-interviewed him in German – and admitted him.

Steven’s description should not, however, be taken as implying that Alan was unclear. Complex – yes; unresolved – sometimes; lengthy sentences with multiple qualifications – frequently; but lack of rigour – rare. Indeed, his contributions remain of value precisely because he bridged and combined the sharpness of analytical philosophy with the breadth and imagination of continental philosophy.

Nor does Stephen’s moniker well describe Alan’s interactions with his students which were often forthright, perceptive, and straightforward. After just a single tutorial, he asked a student from India whether they were feeling homesick. They were and were very touched that Alan had noticed. A second was told in no uncertain terms that the difficulties with his family could not be side-stepped. He had to confront his father. A third was told to rewrite his essay leaving only the first sentence of each paragraph. If a clear argument remained, carry on. If not, start again. The last is always good advice, but it was especially suited to its recipient, a clever student, but easily distracted. 

He was also always on the side of his students. On numerous occasions, the poor performance of X or Y was reported to Tutorial Board with suitable disciplinary action seemingly inevitable, until Alan spoke. His remarks were often complex, but, in essence, suggested that we (the other Tutorial Fellows) had failed to see the full picture. It often took time, but Alan frequently prevailed. As one former colleague said when I suggested the ‘stone in the shoe’ analogy, ‘I like it. It captures not only his influence but also his persistence’.

In many ways Alan was a simply wonderful colleague – supportive and challenging in equal part, keeping one’s wits alive, and endlessly opening new avenues of thought – and everyone, young and old, speaks of how they were always treated as his intellectual equal. But I wish to emphasise a deeper contribution that I personally think Alan made. PPE is often regarded merely as an interesting joint degree that allows students to study three social science disciplines alongside one another with little real connection between them. That has never been the Balliol view and, most assuredly, was never Alan’s view.

The key question is this: are economic theorists better for having done philosophy, and philosophers better for having done politics, or are these three subjects necessarily inter-related? Alan, I am sure, was convinced that the connections between the disciplines were essential. He would have expressed it in a more nuanced way, but I believe that he regarded theories based on the assumption that the person exists ‘as if’ they are independent of society as fundamentally flawed. He felt it essential to inquire what it means to be a person. Alan especially liked Hume’s confession that he, Hume, could not answer this question; and he believed that once this question is addressed and once the person is contextualised, there are deep implications for all three sides of PPE.

Moreover, this philosophical underpinning, I suggest, has provided both an element of continuity and an element of difference to PPE within Balliol and I see Alan as having been an exceptionally significant contributor to this distinctiveness.

Certainly, the prevailing Balliol view of PPE stands in sharp contrast to the study of the social sciences in many other universities (and even most other colleges in Oxford), where ‘economic science’, ‘political science’ and ‘formal logic’ are seen as entirely separate disciplines.  For me, Alan’s insistence on context and on the fuzziness and complexity of the connections between facts and values are not just quirks of his but derive from a deep philosophical underpinning and is a core part of what made – and makes – Balliol PPE distinctive.

This same Balliol continuity can be extended to include many of the people with whom Alan interacted or whom he taught. I think, for example, of Bernard Williams (1947), Akeel Bilgrami (1971), and Stephen Mulhall (1980) in philosophy; Charles Taylor (1952), Michael Sandel, Steven Lukes and Rajeev Bhargava (1975) in political theory; and, in economics, Tommy Balogh (Fellow 1945–1973, Emeritus Fellow 1973–1985), Paul Streeten (1944), Wilfred Beckerman (Fellow and Tutor in Economics 1964–1969 and 1975–1992, Emeritus Fellow 1992–2020) , Hugh Stretton (1946), and Keith Griffin (1960).

Of course, at Balliol we also believe passionately in diversity and, if Balliol had a motto, it might well be ‘The promotion of heresy’. The delineation that I have sketched therefore has had many distinguished exceptions. Nevertheless, when I observe the extent to which in much of the non-Balliol world, the curricula of politics and international relations have tended to be formalised and de-contextualised (especially in the obsession with game theory), and how much philosophy has become focused on logic, and how economics has become a branch of mathematics, it underlines the distinctiveness of PPE as studied at Balliol. If this claim about the difference in approach at Balliol is even remotely true, it is an extraordinary achievement. It is very rare for even a university to have sufficient strength of tradition for it to count as a ‘school’ (Chicago economics is an exception that illustrates the point), but, apart from Balliol, it is unheard of for a single Oxford or Cambridge college to represent a ‘school’.

Perhaps I push the point too far, but I would not be tempted to do so were it not for the influence of Alan. He did not start the tradition, but he revived it, amplified it, filled it with rich furniture, caused many of us to expand our intellectual boundaries, and passed it on, greatly enhanced, to the next generation of students and teachers. Thank you, Alan.

(Reproduced with the kind permission of the author).

Alan Montefiore and Public Philosophy  

Angela Hobbs

In his Tusculan Disputations, Cicero says that Socrates was the first person to bring philosophy down from the heavens and take it into towns and homes, asking fundamental questions about how one should live and what sort of person one should be.

This tradition of public philosophy ebbed and flowed in the West for the next 2,400 years, but by the middle of the twentieth century, certainly in Anglo-American circles, it was in sharp decline.  Alan Montefiore was a major and highly influential force in combatting this decline, particularly through the magnificent Forum for European Philosophy (later the Forum for Philosophy), but also through his work supporting other wonderful organizations, such as the Institute of Art and Ideas – set up, of course, and presided over by one of Alan’s former students, Hilary Lawson.

The Forum was originally the brainchild of Catherine, wanting to build on her positive experience at the Collège International de Philosophie in Paris.  Alan embraced the idea with enthusiasm, and the first planning meeting took place in their home in 1996.

The aim was to promote wider dialogue in three main ways: between philosophers in the U.K. and the rest of Europe (particularly in respect of building bridges between analytic and what was then termed continental philosophy); dialogue between philosophy and other disciplines; and dialogue between academic philosophers and the interested general public (or publics as Alan would greatly prefer).

The goal was far more ambitious than simply reporting philosophical concepts and arguments; Alan had a philosophically informed and deeply held interest in what it meant to think philosophically in public — publics — the active, creative thinking taking place in ever increasing circles of friendly participants.  Alan’s dedication was to philosophy not simply as an academic discipline, but as a way of life —  and always incorporating his belief, following Kant, in our dual nature, both rational and also natural beings bound in the chains of cause and effect.

The Forum offered a rich array of talks, seminars and panel discussions, and one of Alan’s most important contributions was the In Conversation series, in a format that he developed, in which he spoke with eminent philosophers (such as Adrian Moore and Miranda Fricker).  On a separate occasion he interviewed Jacques Derrida in a packed Sheldonian Theatre.

But back to the Forum.  It is highly telling how many of Alan’s former students were willingly brought on board to assist the Forum in a variety of ways — testament both to Alan’s vision of philosophy as a way of life to be enjoyed with friends, and a tribute to his inspirational qualities as a teacher (their distinguished careers also bear testament to that).  Special mention must of course go to Simon Glendinning, who was a wonderful Director of the Forum for nearly twenty years, and did so much to shape it and strengthen its productive collaboration with the LSE.  But so many others supported the Forum too, whether serving on the Executive Committee or as speakers at the City Circle Dinners: Hugo Dixon, Stephanie Flanders, Paul Flather, Hilary Lawson, Jonathan Rée, Hugh Tomlinson.  Many apologies if I have missed someone.

The public philosophy, the teaching and his academic research were all of a piece: Alan’s character and life were an integrated whole.  Which brings us back to Socrates.  In Plato’s dialogue the Laches, about courage and how to be a complete man, two men ask the old general, Laches, whether Socrates would be a good person to consult on how to educate their sons.  And Laches says yes, absolutely, because Socrates has made a true concord of his words and his deeds.  I saw this utter integrity many times myself, both during Executive Committee meetings at the Forum and also at the Institute of Art and Ideas: Alan was a trustee when I was Chair.  A problem or disagreement would arise; Alan would listen attentively to all the views; and then he would speak, quietly but decisively, and with perfect judgement.  In ancient Greek there is one word, deinos, for clever, and another term, sophos, for wise.  Alan was sophos.

And it always seemed to me that all the sustained energy, which he translated so effectively into action, came from a still, contemplative core, utterly dedicated to words and truth — a core the world badly needs right now.  So I would like to end by reading a short poem by Wallace Stevens, which conjures up for me this remarkable man:

The House was Quiet and the World was Calm

The house was quiet and the world was calm.
The reader became the book; and summer night

Was like the conscious being of the book.
The house was quiet and the world was calm.

The words were spoken as if there was no book,
Except that the reader leaned above the page,

Wanted to lean, wanted much most to be
The scholar to whom his book is true, to whom

The summer night is like a perfection of thought.
The house was quiet because it had to be.

The quiet was part of the meaning, part of the mind:
The access of perfection to the page.

And the world was calm.  The truth in a calm world,
In which there is no other meaning, itself

Is calm, itself is summer and night, itself
Is the reader leaning late and reading there.

Professor Angie Hobbs FRSA
Professor of the Public Understanding of Philosophy Emerita
University Of Sheffield

(Reproduced with the kind permission of the author)

Alan Montefiore, address to the memorial service at Balliol, May 30th, 2025.

Anthony O’Hear

It is a privilege for me to be speaking at this wonderful event in honour of Alan, but I feel something of an intruder, because it was only in recent years that I got to know Alan at all well, though he was the external examiner in my first year as a lecturer at Hull (1972); and soon after I had become director of the Royal Institute of Philosophy in 1994, I helped Alan establish the Forum for European Philosophy, initially as a branch of the RIP. Several years ago, I joined the London Society for the Study of Religion, of which Alan was a member, and I think he may have proposed me. The LSSR was founded by Claude Montefiore, Alan’s grandfather, in collaboration with Baron von Hugel and others, in 1904, to further dialogue between the three Abrahamic religions – the proper relationship between different religions being a topic of abiding concern to Alan, and one which we used to talk about together in fairly regular meetings in his home over the past few years, when I was myself writing The Prism of Truth, a book on the place of myth in religions.

What really focused my mind was when at one of these meetings Alan asked me what I thought of the Jesuit theologian Karl Rahner’s notion of anonymous Christians – that is the idea that people who had never heard of Christ or had lived before him, might be seen as Christians without knowing it, and redeemed as if they had been baptized Christians. I actually disliked this idea because it struck me as both patronizing and disrespectful of faiths other than the Christian, as if only Christians by whatever name could be saved. 

However, as Alan emphasized, in an article on religious doctrine and ecumenism (1), Rahner was wrestling with a genuine problem, as were the founders of the LSSR: given that belief – any belief – aims at truth, what can religious believers say about their belief in relation to the beliefs of other traditions? In their apparent contrariety, can they all, or indeed any, actually be true?

From Alan’s own perspective this question is a specific case of what he calls the human paradox – the way in which we are each particular individuals with our own histories and needs and perspectives but also subject to the universal demands of reason, both in terms of morality and truthfulness. This paradox bites sharply when a religion claiming universal validity stems from a particular church or tradition, in opposition to other churches or traditions making similar claims.

He approaches this problem somewhat obliquely (2): given that no human church or faith can express literal truth about a transcendent God or reality – something often stressed by theologians and other religious thinkers, including Thomas Aquinas himself –  just how are we to construe belief in the religious case? Add to that the radical imperfectibility of any human institution, including or perhaps especially religious ones, are we reduced to seeing their apparently conflicting doctrines in some non-fact-affirming way, in Alan’s words, as ‘essentially non-cognitive’ (3), as simply the markers of a ritual tradition or communal practice of greater or lesser value, and not to be understood as truth affirming?

At this point, Alan considers with some sympathy what he calls ‘atheistic’ religious world-views (4), such as that of Ronald Dworkin, a fully secular thinker, who wants to look at the world not just with curiosity and wonder but with gratitude and reverence: but as Alan points out these latter notions implicitly see one as the recipient of what is ‘being offered as a gift’ (5) either from a Supreme Deity or, if not that, at least from the universe itself, no doubt conceived as an agent capable of giving. 

I do not presume to know what Alan’s own ultimate position would be on this conundrum, but would simply remind you that he did speak of his stance on this and other issues to do with the human paradox as ‘a stable unstable position’ (6), and that he constantly came back to the thought that there is no final resolution of certain deeply rooted and inescapably important beliefs. He writes sympathetically of Levinas when the latter takes certain stories from the Hebrew Bible and the Talmud as dramatizing the eternal struggle between justice and mercy or forgiveness, between the rational universal and the human particular. (7) Alan was always too sensitive a thinker simply to opt for one side of these paradoxical conflicts so central to our nature, but rather to hold both in an uneasy balance.

I am not aware that Alan ever wrote about Charles Péguy or Simone Weil, but I like to think that he might have had sympathy with both these great Christian souls, who died outside the church.  Péguy, who founded the modern pilgrimages to Chartres, was apostrophized by Geoffrey Hill as seeing ‘the table laid/ for early mass from which you stood aside/ to find salvation’; and Simone Weil, who for all her mystical faith in Christ, died unable to solve the paradox of the fate of non-Christians from the Christian point of view. I think that von Hugel and other early members of the LSSR would have sympathized with both. Where Alan might have stood, I would not presume to say. Here I would simply like to record my own gratitude to Alan for the conversations we had on religion, and also for the crucial help he gave me with my own thinking on the topic.         

References.

All quotations from Alan Montefiore are from his collection Philosophy and the Human Paradox: Essays on Reason, Truth and Identity, edited by Danielle Sands, New York and London: Routledge, 2020 (PHP). The quotation from Geoffrey Hiil is from Canto 5 of his poem ‘The Mystery of the Charity of Charles Péguy’ (Collected Poems, London: Penguin, 1987, 189.)

1.     ‘Doctrinal Commitment and Ecumenical Partnership’ PHP, 162-77

2.     PHP, 171

3.     Ibid

4.     op cit, 174

5.     op cit, 175

6.     ‘An Inconclusive Conclusion’, PHP, 178-90, at 180

7.     ‘Levinas and the Cl but oneaims of Incommensurable Vlaues’ PHP, 129-44, at 140-1

(Reproduced with the kind permission of the author)

Chariots of Fire
A tribute to Alan Montefiore

Ramona Fotiade
Reader in French
The School of Modern Languages
University of Glasgow

Alan Montefiore was a philosopher who, although steeped in the Anglo-American tradition, had the unique ability to understand and respond to a range of other philosophical traditions and cultural contexts. And this is not only because of his unparalleled understanding of Kantian philosophy or because of his knowledge of Chinese and understanding of non-European cultural traditions, but because of the keen interest he had in the people who happened to express these different viewpoints. Alan’s interlocutors, in real life or in his writing, were actual people, not impersonal ideas. His interest in identity stemmed from his interactions with those who found themselves, due to the force of circumstance or out of their own choosing, on the borderline of two or more possible ethnic or national groups – people in search of a sense of belonging, sometimes in search of a home, if not of the mere recognition of their heterogeneous background.
I was fortunate enough to meet him during his last years at Balliol College, when I was living in London as a Romanian exile, writing articles for journals on Eastern Europe, looking for outlets of my poems and plays in English translation and studying for an MA in Film Studies at the University of Westminster. At the time I also had the project of a doctoral thesis on the Jewish-Ukrainian existential thinker, Lev Shestov, and his Jewish-Romanian disciple, Benjamin Fondane, both influential yet unjustly forgotten figures of the East-European diaspora in Paris in the 1920s and 1930s. Then a friend at the East European Reporter recommended Jessica Douglas-Home as someone I could see about my playwrighting projects and the idea of a PhD thesis, and she in turn recommended Alan.
It was I think on a cold late autumn day in 1991 that I went to see Alan at Balliol, and we talked about the East European diaspora in Paris, about Shestov, Fondane and probably Sartre – given that my knowledge of philosophy was limited to Existentialism at the time. Alan not only lent a sympathetic ear to my project, but in the coming weeks played a crucial part in helping me find several potential supervisors while I was putting together my application, and finally even provided the funding for my registration from the Grut Charitable Trust. My life was about to change in the most radical and lasting manner, but the most extraordinary transformation for me came about as I started spending more and more of my time at Oxford reading philosophy and meeting the circle of students or ex-students who had also received Alan’s help, informal tuition or supervision. This obviously benefitted my ability to understand Shestov and his polemic with Husserl and Heidegger, but in retrospect I must admit that my interest in systematic philosophy was first and foremost an attempt to please Alan and be able to have a ‘real’ conversation with him. This was, as I would come to realise, very similar to Fondane’s story, who started studying philosophy and writing philosophical articles to please Shestov. It took me a very long time to notice the striking similarities between Shestov and Alan Montefiore in terms of their family background (as elder sons of respected Jewish families), and of their identity problem (as far as philosophers with a keen sense of moral duty, yet in search of autonomy and of what Alan called ‘the most significant centre of meaning in or to one’s life’). Otherwise, everything seemed to situate them at opposites ends of the philosophical spectrum as far as the relationship between reason and faith (or Athens and Jerusalem) was concerned.
In my second year at Oxford, I started going to the seminar on cultural identity which Alan organised at his house with the participation of a wide range of students, tutors and visiting scholars from all over the world. I remember listening to the talk of a philosopher from Malaysia, while sitting in a circle in Alan’s living room one evening, surrounded by research students from Israel, Italy, Canada, France and the U.K. When my turn came to give a paper later in the term, I could not help playing the part of the enfant terrible and tore to pieces the notion of ‘national identity’ (my own interpretation of ‘cultural identity’), just in case anything I said about being Romanian turned into the kind of label people stick on you for the sake of convenience and then forget to look beyond it. There was some Nietzsche in there, with the idea that national identity is a metaphor we have forgotten is a metaphor, and some Derrida, with the deconstruction of the notions of the ‘proper’ (identity), of ‘birth’ and of ‘origin’. I think it mystified all those present and came as a bit of a surprise to Alan, although he was more than anyone aware of the sensitivity surrounding the notion of identity for a migrant intellectual trying to integrate into English society. Two decades later, when his volume, A Philosophical Retrospective: Facts, Values and Jewish Identity, was published, it was such a reassuring and humbling experience to find out that his interest in identity stemmed from a personal confrontation with the conundrums of being a secular Jew and an Englishman, as well as a philosopher arguing for the individual right to reject the labelling of ‘an “outside world” that insists on classifying you as a member of a group it regards and treats as irremediably inferior’.
Among the life-changing conversations I had with Alan on this topic is one that came back to me after the devastating news of his passing away in Paris, only a day before I was due to see him, in one of the cruellest twists of fate. We were walking on a summer day in the University Parks in Oxford, near the cricket pitch, and we were talking about famous English athletes. I mentioned Hudson’s film, Chariots of Fire, and the story of the two friends, Harold Abrahams, the English Jew, and Eric Liddell, the Christian missionary from Scotland, who both ran and won medals in the 1924 Olympics in Paris. While Liddell, ‘the Flying Scotsman’, ran for his faith, Abrahams ran against prejudice and won a gold medal which earned him much needed recognition not only in the closed academic circles of Cambridge, where he was a student, but in the highest echelons of English society. I think Alan simply quipped that Abraham was an agnostic Jew and that he never won against Liddell. But then, unexpectedly, made me the gift of a rare memory from his childhood, he who so rarely talked about himself. It was the memory of a cricket match which he played with his school team, and during which his team was led by a good innings. When all but two of the batsmen had been dismissed, his turn came. He managed to hit a ball which crossed the boundary without bouncing and scored enough runs to equalise the score and then went on to successfully complete the innings and win the match. ‘It was the happiest day in my life’, Alan said with a smile in his quiet and quizzical way.
As I think back at this now, I realise that his entire life was like this long innings which he played the best he could, not for King and country, nor for personal glory, but so that others could also be given the chance to get on the playing field and win the race one day. And while a hundred years ago they said of Harold Abrahams and his prejudiced competitors: ‘He did it. He ran them of their feet’, the fact remains that for Alan Montefiore life and philosophy were always a team game. Thank you, Alan, I am forever grateful for being part of your team.

(Reproduced with the kind permission of the author)

Simon Glendinning

Dear Catherine,

Anjali and I were so, so sorry to hear the unbelievable news that Alan has left us.

In the midst of your grief, I want you to know how important Alan has been for me.

Oxford. First, as a BPhil student who was reading Heidegger as well as Kant, Alan welcomed me into his own ongoing conversations with both; then, as a DPhil student who was now reading Derrida as well as Wittgenstein, Alan did not block the unmade road I was trying to navigate.

LSE. I simply would not have made the jump to the European Institute and the Forum for European Philosophy had Alan not been standing with me. He has been, throughout my life in philosophy, the singular figure without whom I would not have made my way as I have.

And one can say the same not only for others like me but for philosophy in Britain overall, both in its academic formation and in its public presence. Alan did a great deal to begin to calm the English terror of intellectual life.

I have so much to be grateful to Alan for. But it is impossible to think of Alan and his contribution without thinking of you both: your ongoing philosophical conversation with each other – and with the world, through your creation and devotion to the Forum. I am sincerely grateful to you both for your generous hospitality to me and to Anjali. I am so glad that she has been able to spend time with you both.

I was aware of you before we first met – via Alan. He had asked me if I could pick up a library book for you – he couldn’t get away. What was so clear was not only that it was important to him to get the task done but the pride he had in your work, how seriously he took your research.

I know that I am just one of Alan’s many philosophical children. It’s a really extraordinary legacy and I am so lucky to have been part of it. Alan meant so much to so many – and so many owe him so much too. But of course, you are the person who meant most to him, and Anjali and I are thinking of you at this painful time.

As ever,

 Simon

Simon Glendinning

Head of the European Institute

Professor of European Philosophy

(Reproduced with the kind permission of the author)